Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Public Choice Theory on Public Law - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 181 Public law/Public Choice theory/Farber: From a public choice perspective, public law can be seen as a set of institutional structures that address the difficulties of cooperative action between instrumentally rational individuals. Institutions that fail to develop such mechanisms cannot function effectively. This insight into roots of legal institutions provides a powerful, unifying conception of the structures of legal institutions and also focuses attention on the importance of institutions in shaping outcomes. These structures help such individuals cooperate with each other and make coherent group decisions, but sometimes at the expense of creating opportunities for sub-groups to profit at the expense of the group as a whole. Normatively, public law should strive for institutions that, as much as possible, allow government to promote public values while minimizing opportunities to exploit the process for private gain. (…) public choice may provide insights relevant to public law about how legislatures, courts, and agencies behave and interact. Parisi I 182 But at this point, at least, the models are far from robust (Stephenson, 2010(2), p. 315), and empirical evidence is often scanty or inconclusive (Mashaw, 2010(2), pp. 49-50).* >Rational choice/Public choice theory, >Collective action/Public choice theory. * 1 For an early critique highlighting empirical issues, see Green and Shapiro (1994)(3). In fairness, the crudeness of early public choice models presented an easy target for such criticism. 1. Stephenson, M. C. (2010). "Statutory Interpretation by Agencies," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19—48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Mashaw, J. (2010). "Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19-48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 3. Green, D. P. and I. Shapiro (1994). Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Have, CT: Yale University Press. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Public Choice Theory Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Public Choice Theory
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